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the country only briefly had made an entry upon their resent from
21
turn.
In arriving at its decision in Rosenberg, the Court looked to congressional intent.22 It pointed to the fact that in codifying the definition of entry in the 1952 Act, Congress was ameliorating the
harsh results visited upon resident aliens by the rule of Volpe v.
Smith23 and that the bill gave due recognition to judicial precedents.2 4 The Court concluded that to effectuate congressional purpose, intent would have to be construed as meaning an intent "to
depart in a manner which can be regarded as meaningfully interruptive of the alien's permanent residence." 25 Factors relevant to the
determination of this intent are the length of time the alien is absent,
the purpose of the visit, and a need of the alien to procure travel
documents.26
While the Court's interpretation of congressional intent is rather
tenuous,2 7 the end result seems only fair. The insignificance of a
brief trip to Mexico or Canada bears little relation to the punitive
consequence of subsequent excludability.
John V. Stroud

IS ENTITLED
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -WIDOW
TO DEATH BENEFITS. DECEASED HUSBAND, RECIPIENT OF A FOOTBALL SCHOLARSHIP, IS AN EMPLOYEE
OF HIS COLLEGE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT. Van Horn v.IndustrialAccident Commission (Cal. App. 1963).
Van Horn, an outstanding athlete while in high school, was recruited by California State Polytechnic Institute for its football team.
In accordance with the promises made to him by the school coach,
he was paid $50 at the beginning of each academic quarter, and another sum to defray his rental expenses during the football season.
In addition, he was paid an hourly wage to line the football field;
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this activity was the only work, in the usual sense of the word, that
he performed for the College.
Van Horn and some of his teammates were killed in the crash
of a plane which had been chartered by the school to return the team
from an out-of-state football game. His widow applied for death benefits under the California Workmen's Compensation Act. The application was denied by the Industrial Accident Commission on
the ground that decedent was not an employee of the college within
the meaning of the Act. Reversed, on appeal; he was an employee.
Van Horn v. Industrial Accident Commission, 219 A.C.A. 523, 33
Cal. Rptr. 169 (1963).
Workmen's compensation legislation is designed to alleviate for
employees and their dependents the financial distress which would
otherwise result from injuries and/or deaths or other causes occurring
in the course of employment. By this legislation, the employer's liability is no longer based on fault, nor are the common-law defenses
to negligence generally applicable. The intent of such legislation
is to shift the economic burden from the employee to the industry,
and ultimately to the consumer.' The right to this extended compensation is statutory.2
In California, the right to compensation depends upon the existence of a contract of employment 3 and an injury arising out of
and in the course of employment.4 The question as to whether a
student who is a recipient of an athletic scholarship qualifies for compensation benefits can arise in two situations: first, where there is
a contract between the student and the school whereby the student
is employed to engage in a particular sport; and second, where the
student is employed to perform certain work (in the usual sense)
for the school, with continued employment being conditional upon
his playing in a particular sport.
The situation involving employment of a student to engage in a
particular sport is similar to that of a professional athlete. In Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. of New York v. Huhn,' a professional
baseball player was found to be an "employee" within the mean1 99 C.J.S. Workmers Compensation 5(a) (1958).
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ing of the Georgia compensation act. In that case an injury on the
playing field was found to squarely meet the requirements: a contract of employment, and injury arising in the performance of the
contract. On the other hand, some states have specifically excluded
professional athletes from their compensation acts. In Florida,6 for
example, service performed by a professional athelete is expressly
excluded from the definition of the term "employment," and in
Massachusetts7 a professional athlete is excluded from workmen's
compensation benefits if his contract of employment provides for
the payment of wages during the period of his disability from injury
suffered in the course of such employment.
In considering whether an athletic scholarship is a contract of employment to play a particular sport, the question arises: Is the offer
of remuneration by the college a gratuitous promise conditioned upon
engaging in a particular sport for the school, or is it bargainedfor consideration which gives rise to a contract of employment? The
problem can be illuminated considerably by comparing it with Professor Williston's celebrated example of the benevolent man saying
to a tramp, "If you go around the corner to the clothing shop, there
you may purchase an overcoat on my credit."8 Williston points out
that no reasonable person would understand that the short walk
was requested as consideration for the promise. "An aid, though not
a conclusive test in determining which interpretation of the promise
is more reasonable, is an inquiry whether the happening of the condition will be a benefit to the promisor. If so, it is a fair inference
that the happening was requested as a consideration."9
In this light, a distinction emerges between athletic and academic
scholarships. An academic scholarship results in little direct economic
benefit to the college. The primary beneficial effects of the scholarship-motivation to achieve and maintain a certain level of academic achievement, and financial assistance in obtaining a college
education-all directly benefit the promisee-student, not the promisor-school. There are admittedly benefits accruing to the school, but
they are much more nebulous. On this basis the academic scholarship can be described as a gratuitous promise conditioned upon the
fulfillment of certain requirements. In the case of an athletic scholarship, on the other hand, more direct economic benefits accrue to the
college. The football games in which the student participates provide
revenue that usually substantially supports the school's total athletic
program. Another factor, more difficult to measure from an economic
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standpoint but no less real, is the value of the publicity the team receives, which can be of significant benefit to the school. Therefore,
provided there is present an element of bargain and exchange, under the "benefit to promisor" test the athlete's participation in the
games would constitute bargained-for consideration for the promise
of compensation on the part of the school, and the employer-employee
relationship would arise. It is not necessary that the compensation
be in the form of wages or pecuniary assistance. Courts have held
that tuition,1" exchange of services,'1 and other forms of non-pecu-

niary compensation are sufficient.
In the Van Horn case, the contract of employment to play football is analogous to that normally found in professional athletics.
The negotiations between the decedent and his coach for financial
assistance took place in the Spring of 1958. It was not until 1960
that he performed any work in the usual sense for the college. The
original agreement provided only for the playing of football and
was in effect at the time of his death. He was killed, in transportation furnished by the school, while returning from a game in which
he had participated. Therefore, there is little question as to his
death arising during the course of his employment. The court viewed
the contractual aspects of the Van Horn case as follows: "After a
careful review of the evidence, we are of the opinion that the finding of the commission that there was no contract of employment is
not supported by the evidence. The record reveals that petitioners
established a prima facie case for benefits upon the presentation of
evidence showing the alleged contract of employment. The coach,
with whom it was shown that decedent made the alleged contract,
testified at length; yet nowhere in his testimony is there a denial by
him that he made a contract with decedent."' 2 Applying the rule
that, where there is an absence of conflicting evidence, "any person
rendering service for another, other than as an independent contractor, or unless expressly excluded herein, is presumed to be an
employee,"' 3 the court found that an employer-employee relationship
existed.
Van Horn was a case of first impression in California. The only
other appellate decision in this country considering the precise ques10
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tion decided in Van Horn, i.e., whether the student was employed
to play football, is State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Accident Commission.14 In this case recovery under the Colorado act was
sought by the widow of a student who had been fatally injured while
playing in a football game for Fort Lewis A. & M. The decedent
had enjoyed an atheltic scholarship known as "Grant-in-aid" which
consisted of a waiver of tuition. He was also a part-time employee
of the school, but this part-time employment was not conditioned
upon his playing football. The Colorado Supreme Court dismissed
the widow's claim. It was pointed out that the decedent was not
hired to play football and that he would have retained his part-time
employment whether he played or not. Furthermore, the court said:
"It is significant that the college did not receive a direct benefit
from the activities, since the college was not in the football business and received no benefit from this field of recreation."' 5 (Emphasis added).
To hold that an organization receives no benefit from activities
which are a source of actual revenue to it seems subject to criticism.
Nevertheless, the case held no contract of employment to play football existed. It is interesting to note that this conclusion was reached
despite the facts that the student-athlete received remuneration in
the form of a waiver of tuition, that the college derived revenue
from the games, and that the element of "bargain and exchange"
was also present (the decedent had been working part-time at a gasoline station when the coach approached him with an offer to arrange
other part-time employment if he would play football).
Another Colorado case dealing with a football injury, where the
student was also otherwise employed to perform certain tasks around
campus, is University of Denver v. Nemeth. 6 Here the student sustained a back injury while playing football. At the time of his injury he was receiving $50 monthly from the University for working about the tennis court. His meals were provided for a nominal
fee, and his room was supplied in exchange for cleaning the furnace
at the dormitory. This arrangement was dependent upon his remaining on the football squad. The Industrial Accident Commission held
that the student was employed to play football and awarded compensation. This award was affirmed on appeal, the appellate court placing significance on the fact that the retention of benefits and jobs
on the campus was dependent upon the student's remaining on the
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football squad. Therefore, playing football was an incident of the
employment, and the injury arose out of and in the course of his
employment.
Whether the school is receiving reasonable value for the remuneration it gives constitutes another criterion the court might use
in deciding whether there is an employer-employee relationship.
Thus, if it appears that the jobs assigned were shams (the value
of the scholarship being disproportionate to the services rendered),
it could be inferred that participation in the sport is the real purpose of the arrangement and is an incident of the employment.
To summarize, the courts in two situations have allowed recovery under workmen's compensation acts to the student-recipient
of an athletic scholarship. First, where a contract of employment
to play a sport can be established; and second, where there is
employment to perform certain tasks, which employment is dependent upon the student playing the sport.
In Van Horn an employer-employee relationship was found to
have arisen of which, very likely, the coach, student, and school
were all unaware. This holding might result in athletic scholarships
becoming an expensive proposition for colleges, considering the
number of permanent injuries and deaths which result from contact sports. The Industrial Accident Commission remarked in its
denial of the application for death benefits that "to hold that decedent was an employee would impose a heavy burden on institutions of learning and would discourage the granting of scholarships."'" This may be true and could cause a reduction in scholarships, but it is the natural result of calling a spade a spade where
one finds a hole in the ground.
Joe N. Turner

FELONY-MURDER

-

SURVIVING CO-FELONS ARE PUN-

ISHABLE FOR FIRST DEGREE VURDER UNDER CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE SECTION 189 FOR THE KILLING OF A CONFEDERATE BY THE OWNER OF THE
STORE WHICH THEY WERE ROBBING. People v. Hand,

(San Diego July 22, 1963).
In the process of executing a planned robbery of a store, one of
four robbers was killed by the owner. The store had been previously robbed and the owner was waiting for such a recurrence.
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